### 1



#### One general law, leading to the advancement of all organic beings, namely, multiply, vary, let the strongest live and weakest die….[[1]](#footnote-1)

(Constitutional Rights Foundation, No Date, “BRIA 19 2 b Social Darwinism and American Laissez-faire Capitalism,” <https://www.crf-usa.org/bill-of-rights-in-action/bria-19-2-b-social-darwinism-and-american-laissez-faire-capitalism.html>)

"Society advances," Spencer wrote, "where its fittest members are allowed to assert their fitness with the least hindrance." He went on to argue that the unfit should "not be prevented from dying out." Unlike Darwin, Spencer believed that individuals could genetically pass on their learned characteristics to their children. This was a common, but erroneous belief in the 19th century. To Spencer, the fittest persons inherited such qualities as industriousness, frugality, the desire to own property, and the ability to accumulate wealth. The unfit inherited laziness, stupidity, and immorality. According to Spencer, the population of unfit people would slowly decline. They would eventually become extinct because of their failure to compete**.** The government, in his view, should not take any actions to prevent this from happening, since this would go against the evolution of civilization.

#### Evolution pulses through the bloodline of society. Survival is the prize and competition is its gatekeeper.

#### Queerness illuminates itself in the shadow of Darwinism demonstrating the mantra of “survival of the fittest” is not just a biological, but also social imperative. Whether it’s Pat Robertson’s statement that AIDS is “God’s way of weeding his garden,” or the attribution of queerness itself as a defect of “decadence,” queerness becomes the marker for society’s genocidal impulse to demonstrate that there are some populations that were born to die

Sedgwick 8 (Eve, Professor of English at Duke University, Epistemology of the Closet, second revised edition, California at Berkeley Press, p. 127-130)

From at least the biblical story of Sodom and Gomorrah, scenarios of same-sex desire would seem to have had a privileged, though by no means an exclusive, relation in Western culture to scenarios of both genocide and omnicide. That sodomy, the name by which homosexual acts are known even today to the law of half of the United States and to the Supreme Court of all of them, should already be inscribed with the name of a site of mass extermination is the appropriate trace of a double history. In the first place there is a history of the mortal suppression, legal or subjudicial, of gay acts and gay people, through burning, hounding, physical and chemical castration, concentration camps, bashing—the array of sanctioned fatalities that Louis Crompton records under the name of gay genocide, and whose supposed eugenic motive becomes only the more colorable with the emergence of a distinct, naturalized minority identity in the nineteenth century. In the second place, though, there is the inveterate topos of associating gay acts or persons with fatalities vastly broader than their own extent: if it is ambiguous whether every denizen of the obliterated Sodom was a sodomite, clearly not every Roman of the late Empire can have been so, despite Gibbon's connecting the eclipse of the whole people to the habits of a few. Following both Gibbon and the Bible, moreover, with an impetus borrowed from Darwin, one of the few areas of agreement among modern Marxist, Nazi, and liberal capitalist ideologies is that there is a peculiarly close, though never precisely defined, affinity between same-sex desire and some historical condition of moribundity, called "decadence," to which not individuals or minorities but whole civilizations are subject. Bloodletting on a scale more massive by orders of magnitude than any gay minority presence in the culture is the "cure," if cure there be, to the mortal illness of decadence. If a fantasy trajectory, utopian in its own terms, toward gay genocide has been endemic in Western culture from its origins, then, it may also have been true that the trajectory toward gay genocide was never clearly distinguishable from a broader, apocalyptic trajectory toward something approaching omnicide. The deadlock of the past century between minoritizing and universalizing understandings of homo/heterosexual definition can only have deepened this fatal bond in the heterosexist imaginaire. In our culture as in Billy Budd, the phobic narrative trajectory toward imagining a time after the homosexual is finally inseparable from that toward imagining a time after the human; in the wake of the homosexual, the wake incessantly produced since first there were homosexuals, every human relation is pulled into its shining representational furrow. Fragments of visions of a time after the homosexual are, of course, currently in dizzying circulation in our culture. One of the many dangerous ways that AIDS discourse seems to ratify and amplify preinscribed homophobic mythologies is in its pseudo-evolutionary presentation of male homosexuality as a stage doomed to extinction (read, a phase the species is going through) on the enormous scale of whole populations. 26 The lineaments of openly genocidal malice behind this fantasy appear only occasionally in the respectable media, though they can be glimpsed even there behind the poker-face mask of our national experiment in laissez-faire medicine. A better, if still deodorized, whiff of that malice comes from the famous pronouncement of Pat Robertson: "AIDS is God's way of weeding his garden." The saccharine luster this dictum gives to its vision of devastation, and the ruthless prurience with which it misattributes its own agency, cover a more fundamental contradiction: that, to rationalize complacent glee at a spectacle of what is imagined as genocide, a proto-Darwinian process of natural selection is being invoked—in the context of a Christian fundamentalism that is not only antievolutionist but recklessly oriented toward universal apocalypse. A similar phenomenon, also too terrible to be noted as a mere irony, is how evenly our culture's phobia about HIV-positive blood is kept pace with by its rage for keeping that dangerous blood in broad, continuous circulation. This is evidenced in projects for universal testing, and in the needle-sharing implicit in William Buckley's now ineradicable fantasy of tattooing HIV-positive persons. But most immediately and pervasively it is evidenced in the literal bloodbaths that seem to make the point of the AIDS-related resurgence in violent bashings of gays--which, unlike the gun violence otherwise ubiquitous in this culture, are characteristically done with two-by-fours, baseball bats, and fists, in the most literal-minded conceivable form of body-fluid contact.

#### The aff’s establishment of antitrust law is part and parcel of this Darwinian fantasy. Through the figure of Homo Economicus, financialization now serves as the primary regime of natural selection that dominates subjects into submission to ensure a neoliberal present and future. What’s needed now is not a refinement of our financial protocols but its abolition

McWhorter 12 (Ladelle McWhorter, James Thomas Professor of Philosophy and Professor of the Women's, Gender, and Sexualities Studies Program at the University of Richmond, “Queer Economies,” September 2012, Foucault Studies, No. 14)

The project of queering identities began in the early 1990s as a way of breaking down rigid delineations of experience and desire. Queer theorists pointed out numerous examples of ambiguous or veiled homosexual desire in apparently heterosexual images, tropes, characters, and plot lines in classical literature, drama, and film, as well as in popular culture. They showed us that our own real-life sexual and gender identities were simulacra, constantly requiring reenactment, reiteration, and representation to bolster and sustain themselves. They resisted and challenged homogeneity of identification by inciting identities to proliferate and endlessly differ from themselves. In short, where our normalized identities defined and imprisoned us, they excavated exits and melted bars. They showed us that those identities had histories and political investments and interests that transcended and sometimes opposed our individual lives and well-being. They laid bare the mechanisms of disciplinary normalization. They encouraged us to experience dis-identification and estrangement. In Foucault’s terms, they helped us to get free of ourselves.51Now, however, if disciplinary normalization is receding where it is in tension with expanding regimes of security wherein circulation (of money, commodities, information, human bodies, etc.), not development, is paramount, how are queer theory and politics situated? If “queer” resists the forces that would contain us in normalized identities, can “queer” also resist the forces that would transform us into utility maximizers operating as entrepreneurial firms? Or is it more likely just to render us all more open to marketing across what used to be our normalized identity boundaries? The question is pressing because, on some fronts at least, it looks like queering identities facilitates the expansion and multiplication of markets. To attract a desired mate, a straight man might need to invest in his human capital by learning from—and then by purchasing the same products as—men with fashionable “queer eyes,” as depicted on an early twenty-first century reality TV show, “Queer Eye for the Straight Guy.” Straight masculinity needs to be softened or refined; hence, a little queerness is good for everybody. In some queer youth cultures, boundary breaking and gender-bending strategies rely very heavily on deploying purchased products; one announces one’s challenges to identification through clothes, jewelry, hair styles, tattoos, personal electronics, and similar accoutrements and often through relatively rapid changes in these modes of personal stylization. After all, in a neoliberal world, what does refusing to be contained in an identity mean other than refusing to make consistent consumer choices? It will be argued that this popular culture appropriation of “queer” has little or nothing to do with the queer politics of the 1970s and 1980s or with the queer theory and politics of the 1990s. And there is merit in that argument. My point is not that the work done in those decades was misguided, only that, with the changes in notions of identity that have occurred with the advance of neoliberalism over the last four decades, that sort of work now will inevitably be appropriated and, to use a very old word, co-opted. It does not challenge neoliberal subjectivities directly enough not to be; its focus was disciplinary normalization. But can we turn queering into resisting neoliberalism? I believe so, and I believe we should. First, why should we? I will not make a comprehensive argument here. Instead, like Foucault in the first lecture of the 1977-1978 series, I will assert a “conditional imperative” 52: If we want to resist domination, if we want to resist the current political tendency to lock people down in a single grid of intelligibility and mode of living (and surely that is essentially what queer politics and queer theory have aimed to oppose all along), then in addition to resisting what remains of normalized disciplinary identities, we must resist and challenge the neoliberal reduction of people to calculating, self-interested entrepreneurs of themselves. This is the way of thinking and approaching life that we all are being pressed into within neoliberal regimes of power. For those few who actually succeed in turning themselves into self-entrepreneurs, viewing every aspect of their existence in terms of competition, investment, and profitable exchange, such a life is likely to be impoverished in every way except financial. And for those who fail—which is likely to be a large majority of people on our planet, including a majority of North Americans and Europeans—the material, if not also the psychological, results are little short of terrifying. What we must queer now, I believe, is not so much normalized identity but neoliberal subjectivity. If neoliberalism is able to impose its conception of human being fully, the world will be a much worse place, in my view, than it is now. Relationships, including communal and civic relationships, will be devalued to the breaking point, and material scarcity in the absence of those relationships will drive people to desperation. So, how can we queer neoliberal subjectivity? Queering, like queer “itself,” never appears in unity. There will be many approaches and possibilities, and they will not obey common distinctions between theory and practice. With that word of caution, I will conclude this essay by discussing three closely related courses of action. The first begins with a policing of our language. Let us pause and consider each time we find ourselves about to describe an action as an “investment.” This, I think, would be the first step in resisting the neoliberal financialization of lives and selves. Sometimes people do invest, such as when they allocate some of their incomes to 401(k)s. But why think of taking classes as “investing”? Why think of maintaining one’s home as “an investment”? Why think of getting to know colleagues at conferences as “investments”? There are other ways to describe these activities. In fact, all these things usually involve some pleasure in the moment and have many desirable effects besides increasing one’s net worth in the marketplace. Interrogating the use of financial language in everyday life is crucial for identifying the ways in which neoliberal discourses and values are shaping us and our relationships. I suspect, furthermore, that a sustained resistance to financial language might also lead us eventually to undertake a critique of neoliberal temporality with its multiple postponements into an apparently unending futurity of projected returns.53 A second, probably closely related practice of resistance to neoliberal domination might begin with simply taking note of desires and pleasures that are neither market-based nor market-valued. Non-(re)productive sexuality might be a prime example, as might friendship and communal relationships outside the kinship systems that are taken to be the fundamental units of capitalist consumption. To be sure, there are ways of construing such things in market terms if we choose to, as Gary Becker’s work makes clear, but if we pay close attention to what really brings us joy in those activities and relationships and find ways of expressing that joy or pleasure or desire in non-financial and non-market terms, collectively we may generate a basis upon which to live in resistance to neoliberal domination. Finally, in addition to examining the ways we speak of our own actions in everyday life and the ways we understand and live in relation to others, we might actually take a more activist stand against gay and lesbian market identities. By this I mean something more than simply challenging stereotypes, which has been done for decades. I mean, also, challenging the gay and lesbian organizations that promote our communities as markets and that buy into the idea that what justice for all amounts to is assimilation into the dominate market economy. Let me quickly add that I am not advocating a withdrawal from market economies (I believe that would be impossible), nor am I suggesting that we relinquish the gains made against discrimination in employment. Instead, I am suggesting, in a Foucauldian vein, that we problematize those goals and do what we can to render them questionable. As David Harvey wrote recently, “We are, often without knowing it, all neoliberals now.” 54 We have already been re-shaped to a great extent, and alternatives to neoliberal language and concepts are no longer readily available. But they can emerge if the radical contingency of our own ways of being make themselves felt in our questioning. In other words, alternatives can form and domination can be opposed through an antineoliberal practice of queer.

#### The aff is homocapitalism and homonationalism par excellence. American corporate progression ensures the regression of the Global South as new markets and businesses pave the way for the structural adjustment of countries in the name of inclusion.

Rao 15 (Rahul Rao, Senior Lecturer in Politics at SOAS University of London, “Global Homocapitalism,” Nov/Dec 2015, Radical Philosophy, <https://www.radicalphilosophy.com/article/global-homocapitalism>)

Temples of global capitalism have become increasingly vociferous of late in their opposition to homophobia. In February 2014, shortly after Uganda’s President Museveni gave his assent to a draconian Anti Homosexuality Act, the World Bank announced that it was delaying a US$90 million loan to Uganda on the grounds that the law would adversely affect health programmes that the loan was intended to support. [1] Bank president Jim Kim justified the decision with the argument that ‘when societies enact laws that prevent productive people from fully participating in the workforce, economies suffer.’ [2] In the same month, the Bank published a study estimating that homophobia and the exclusion of LGBT people cost the Indian economy between 0.1 per cent and 1.7 per cent of its GDP in 2012.3 Both the Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have contributed to the It Gets Better viral video campaign, launched to dissuade queer young people from committing suicide, with short films featuring LGBT staff speaking about growing up queer and being out in their personal and professional lives. [4] In August 2015 The Economist magazine launched ‘Pride and Prejudice’, which it describes as ‘a comprehensive global initiative tackling the business and economic case for LGBT diversity and inclusion’. Culminating in a public event to be held in London in March 2016, the initiative aims to bring together over 200 leaders from the worlds of business, politics and society to catalyse debate on the ‘economic and human costs of discrimination against the LGBT community’. [5] In this article I ask why leading institutions of global capitalism have begun to take activist stances against homophobia, and why they have done so now. I want to understand the terms on which the figure of the queer has come to be adopted as an object of concern for the development industry. Rather than pretending to offer a ‘balanced’ assessment of what is being called the ‘business case’ for LGBT rights, I am interested in thinking through how a radical queer anti-capitalist politics might relate to this emerging discourse. Central to the initiatives mentioned above is a common-sense understanding of homophobia as a cultural disposition that might be disincentivized through the deployment of economic carrots (the promise of growth) and sticks (the withdrawal of capital). Revisiting debates over recognition and redistribution politics, I argue that viewing homophobia as ‘merely cultural’ enables international financial institutions (IFIs) to obscure the material conditions that incubate homophobic moral panics, and their own culpability in co-producing those conditions. Positioning themselves as external to the problem they seek to alleviate, IFIs are able to cast themselves as progressive forces in a greater moral struggle at precisely the historical moment in which austerity and capitalist crisis threaten to bring them into ever greater disrepute. In sum, through a critical survey of recent IFI initiatives on homophobia, I attempt to delineate the emerging contours of what I call ‘global homocapitalism’. Queering ifis Sexuality has long been central to the development agenda, but it has tended to be implicit and framed as the driver of a host of problems, including ‘overpopulation’, reproductive health, sexual violence and disease. Focused on regulation and risk management, the development industry has tended to ignore the more positive and affirmative dimensions of sexuality. And it has, until recently, been deeply heteronormative in its understanding of desire. [6] As Gilles Kleitz puts it, ‘The poor simply can’t be queer, because sexual identities are seen as a rather unfortunate result of western development and are linked to being rich and privileged. The poor just reproduce.’ [7] Nonetheless, the statements and initiatives cited at the start of this article suggest that something is beginning to change. HIV/AIDS has been pivotal in forcing an acknowledgement of the diversity of sexualities and prompting interventions targeted at communities deemed to be especially at risk. Sexual rights victories on issues such as decriminalization of same-sex conduct, recognition of same-sex marriage and adoption rights, and access to gender transition in countries across Europe and the Americas have in turn led international development bureaucracies based in these countries to fund projects dealing with sexual orientation and gender identity (SOGI) elsewhere. The growing prominence of SOGI issues as a development concern is also linked to the increasing propensity of development workers themselves to identify as LGBT in their professional lives. Andil Gosine has traced how the founding in 1993 of GLOBE (the World Bank’s LGBT staff association) was instrumental in getting staff to come out at work and to lobby the Bank for better benefits, but also, eventually, in prompting the Bank to exercise political leadership on HIV/AIDS and to support LGBT advocacy in the global South. [8] Understanding the terms on which new issues are incorporated into the agenda of the Bank can tell us quite a lot about the motivations underpinning such moves. In this regard, I suggest that we have much to learn from the Bank’s longer history of engagement with (cisgendered heterosexual) women as a development constituency. In a study of this engagement, Kate Bedford argues that gender work became central to the Bank’s fashioning of a post-Washington Consensus. Stung by criticism of its ill-fated structural adjustment programmes in the 1980s, which typically demanded liberalization, deregulation and a downsizing of the state in exchange for Bank assistance, the post-Washington Consensus purported to recognize the importance of the state. It abandoned conditionality for a commitment to borrowing-country ‘ownership’ of policymaking and partnership with civil society, and it identified good governance, social safety nets and targeted poverty reduction as key priorities. The family, and especially poor women, became crucial sites for the Bank in demonstrating its commitment to a kinder, more inclusive and humane approach to economic growth. [9] In this, we might see the Bank as exemplifying the long-standing tendency of imperial governmentality to legitimate its will to power in humanitarian justification – what postcolonial theorist Gayatri Spivak has pithily described as ‘white men saving brown women from brown men’. [10] More specifically, guardians of capitalism have always sought to anchor capitalist social relations in extra-market moral justifications, ranging from the libertarian virtues of meritocracy and individual self-worth in neoconservative defences of capitalism to more welfarist concerns such as gender empowerment in neoliberal variants thereof. [11] As Bedford argues, previous Bank gender policy had been criticized for overlooking the double burden placed on women when they entered formal employment, and for ignoring men altogether. Nonetheless the conviction that women were empowered by formal employment remained central to Bank lending. Simultaneously, Bank research on poor men was beginning to suggest that economic hardship engendered a crisis in masculinity when men could no longer play the role of breadwinners. Bedford demonstrates how these critiques and insights produced a new model of intimate attachment that became central to post-Washington Consensus projects, wherein the Bank moved from a breadwinnerhousewife model of domesticity to a two-partner sharing model of love and labour in which women were encouraged to work more outside the home while men were urged to take on greater domestic caring responsibilities. [12] Crucially, Bedford underscores that the new gender regime effectively (re-) privatized responsibility for social reproduction, consistently privileging fatherhood promotion over state provision of childcare in a number of projects. Nonetheless it appealed to a range of different constituencies because its benefits appeared unqualifiedly desirable: greater sharing of the domestic labour of social reproduction was, after all, an unimpeachably feminist goal. Ultimately, the success of the Bank’s new gender regime rested on its ability to link the dual imperatives of efficiency and empowerment: greater female employment in the market promised to liberate traditional gender relations, and better gender relations promised a more efficient allocation of labour resources. [13] Thus, gender relations were reimagined in ways that purported to serve neoliberal and feminist goals. Although Bedford’s study suggests that the Bank was wedded to a heteronormative model of domestic intimacy, there are striking continuities between its reformulation of ideal heterosexual relations and its more recent interest in queer subjects. Describing the post-Washington Consensus interest in poor men, Bedford notes a tendency to think of poverty as engendering a humiliated masculinity, which manifests itself in irresponsible behaviour such as alcoholism, drug abuse, sexual violence and child neglect. These beliefs generate an insistence in Bank policy that ‘poor countries are more sexist than rich ones, and that markets transform gender relations in unequivocally more efficient and empowering directions’. [14] We can see in some of the Bank’s LGBT initiatives the analogous premiss that poor countries are more homophobic than rich ones. While lacking the status of an official policy pronouncement, the Bank’s It Gets Better video (2011) is revealing of the pervasiveness of this assumption. It features an employee reflecting that ‘some [of his colleagues] had it easy coming out. But some others had it difficult. Specially those from developing countries.’ [15] Explaining why it might be difficult for IMF staff to come out at work, one speaker on the Fund’s It Gets Better video (2013) notes that ‘a lot of people at the Fund come from societies that are much less welcoming of gay people and that is a baggage that you don’t leave at the door when you come to the IMF. It’s very hard to overcome that, I think, for people who come from those societies.’ [16] Yet another speaker in the IMF clip elaborates helpfully: ‘We have so many people from all over the world working here, and their ideas of sexuality, of orientation, of how things are supposed to be … it’s all very different. You have anything from progressive Western countries to traditional Eastern countries or African nations or Latin America. And everybody has a different perspective.’ [17] The pervasiveness of these attitudes among Bank staff is borne out by Gosine’s ethnographic work on GLOBE. Asking why gay white men seemed to be overrepresented in its membership relative to the gender and geographical balance in the overall makeup of the Bank’s staff, Gosine teases out two barely disguised assumptions that recurred in his interviews: first, that heterosexual people who were non-white or not from Western countries were more likely to be homophobic; second, that women and non-white men who were not heterosexual hesitated to come out and to join GLOBE because they faced overwhelming ‘cultural’ pressures to remain closeted. [18] Eliding ‘culture’ and levels of ‘development’, these discourses participate in what Jasbir Puar has influentially described as ‘homonationalism’, whereby LGBT rights have become a new marker for old binaries (civilized/savage, developed/less developed). [19] But they do considerably more. In their subversive reworking of the IMF It Gets Better video, the Greek conceptual audiotextual performance duo FYTA suggests that the video is also an artefact of ‘pinkwashing’ in its implicit yoking of its neoliberal economic mission with a ‘civilizing’ anti-homophobic project. [20] Overlaying the IMF video with subtitled commentary, FYTA punctures the monotonously familiar coming-out narratives of well-groomed, largely white, male, upper-middle-class professionals uttered against an aural backdrop of anodyne elevator music, with viciously snarky political and psychoanalytic critique. The most productively jarring moments in the performance come when we are reminded of the dissonance between the values that the individuals featured on the video seek to reclaim from their personal struggles, and those that they promote through their work. When a lesbian Haitian staffer bemoans her upbringing in a Haiti where ‘you don’t hear people talking about gays and lesbians in a very positive way’, FYTA reminds us that Haiti’s contemporary political predicaments can, in quite significant measure, be traced back to the devastation of its agricultural sector by IMF policies foisted on the country in 1986 in return for desperately needed financial assistance. When IMF managing director Christine Lagarde appears on the video to affirm that she wants to head an organization where ‘everybody has to be able to be who they are, and they have to be comfortable, respected, proud of their difference’, FYTA reminds us of Fund policies imposing ‘user fees’ that made education and health care inaccessible to the poorest in many borrowing countries. Beyond the specific instances of hypocrisy that FYTA draws our attention to, there is something apposite about this critique being offered by queer Greek voices in the current conjuncture. Although FYTA is deeply invested in deconstructing Greek nationalism, committing itself in its self-description to ‘wiping out notions of Greek tradition and Greekness’, it is not incidental that its critique should have emerged from Greece. Indeed it does not take much to imagine how self-evidently absurd it must appear to queer Greeks to hear the IMF promise that ‘It Gets Better’, even as it participates in imposing draconian austerity measures on their country. If the It Gets Better videos can be dismissed as amateur efforts that are unrepresentative of IFI policy, this certainly cannot be said about the Bank’s more recent attempts to build an economic case against homophobia. Its 2014 report estimating the cost of homophobia to the Indian economy, authored by economist Lee Badgett, is revealing of the Bank’s emerging interest in queer sexuality. The basic argument is simple enough. Homophobia imposes avoidable costs on economies by lowering productivity and output as a result of employment discrimination, reducing investment in human capital as a result of discrimination in education, and widening health disparities between heterosexual and queer people thanks to the disproportionate risk of HIV/AIDS, violence, depression and suicide borne by the latter. Offering a conservative estimate of these costs as amounting to 0.1–1.7 per cent of 2012 GDP in its chosen case study India, the Bank seeks to incentivize governments to end homophobia by quantifying the economic growth that they would enjoy as a consequence of doing so. [21] Once again, the Bank advances an efficiency rationale for gender empowerment, which appears incontrovertibly good because ending homophobia is desirable for its own sake. Yet in unpacking what is at stake here we must ask not only what the Bank is doing for queers but also what queers are doing for the Bank. As FYTA’s pinkwashing critique of the IMF suggests, a radical agenda is effectively conscripted in the service of the capitalist imperative of expanding output, productivity and markets. Queer visions of the good life become mortgaged to limitless growth, which is itself further insulated from environmental, equity, and other critiques. Beholden to capitalism, the prospects for a queer Green or a queer indigenous politics become increasingly remote. In the political context of the Bank’s work in India, the Bank’s overtures to queers should invite us to interrogate the queer movement’s relations with other social movements – those of farmers, fishworkers and adivasis (forest dwellers) to name only a few – that have struggled against the effects of Bank-led policies for decades. As with queer Greeks and the IMF, it is sobering to imagine what queer adivasis might make of a Bank project that hailed their participation (as queers) in the very processes that are destroying their lifeworlds (as queer adivasis). That the intersectionality of queer and adivasi is virtually unthinkable in the imaginary of the Bank and possibly the mainstream of the queer movement in India begs important questions that I cannot do justice to here. A second problem concerns the deeply reductive account of freedom as participation in the market which appears to animate this project. There is something profoundly troubling about a strategy that makes respect for personhood contingent on the promise of that person’s productivity were their personhood to be fully recognized. To do so is of course not to treat persons as ends in themselves. But it should also prompt us to wonder about the implications of strategies that premiss full citizenship on productivity for those who find themselves unable or unwilling to be ‘productive’ within the terms of the market – the disabled, the unemployed, the elderly, the ‘development’-induced displaced. One consequence of the increasingly tight link between personhood and productivity is that public support for welfare for the ‘unproductive’ becomes increasingly difficult to sustain, especially in a climate of austerity.

#### Reject their call to rally around the spectacle of extinction – it’s rooted in a eugenic project that valorizes reproduction as survival, which embraces a heterosexual future at the expense of queers in the present

Feit 2005. Extinction Anxieties: Same-Sex Marriage and Modes of Citizenship[Feit, Mario.](http://muse.jhu.edu.libweb.lib.utsa.edu/search/results?action=search&searchtype=author&section1=author&search1=%22Feit,%20Mario.%22)Theory & Event, Volume 8, Issue 3, 2005. Asst. Prof.. George Mason University

Why this **doomsday rhetoric**, which outpaces and exceeds the likely consequences of same-sex marriage? Because same-sex marriage calls into question the perpetuation of community *in the face of mortality*. In one case, **reproduction of community** quite literally **is understood as *sexual* reproduction of community**; homosexuality in this instance is presented as lethal because it is non-reproductive.Queer opposition to marriage, on the other hand, presents marriage as a lethal force to a community that does not raise its succeeding generations. In this case, **the fear is that an instrument of heteronormativity overwhelms precarious queer processes of socialization and regeneration.** In short, both **arguments are concerned with the perpetuation of community in light of the absence of** gay sexual **reproduction**.[4](http://muse.jhu.edu.libweb.lib.utsa.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v008/8.3feit.html#_edn4)  Why are these anxieties about the preservation of existing modes of citizenship across time anxieties about mortality? **Because citizenship -- world-making of any kind -- is always also about coping with human finitude**, as Zygmunt Bauman points out: **Such a life** -- life **forgetful of death,** life **lived as meaningful and worth living,** life alive with purposes instead of being crushed and incapacitated by purposelessness -- **is a formidable *human* achievement. The totality of social organization, the whole of human culture** (not certain functionally specialized institutions, nor certain functionally specialized cultural precepts) **cooperate to make this achievement possible.**[5](http://muse.jhu.edu.libweb.lib.utsa.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v008/8.3feit.html#_edn5)  Bauman emphasizes that concern with death and efforts to give meaning to life by transcending death are not to be understood as religious matters, i.e. as falling within the provenance of certain ethical dispositions or cultural institutions. Many aspects of culture, which apparently bear no relation to existential consolation, are very much concerned with it. Indeed, they become highly effective inasmuch the aspiration to transcend death remains unarticulated.[6](http://muse.jhu.edu.libweb.lib.utsa.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v008/8.3feit.html#_edn6)  **Anything that appears to challenge the perpetuation of community evokes the fear of death**. This is why both straight and gay opponents react so intensely to same-sex marriage **-- they fear the extinction of the form of community that provides them with existential consolation**. For straight opponents, George Weinberg's explanation is salient: "**The** notion that there are homosexuals **distresses some people because the thought of persons without children reawakens their fear of death**. Today in the larger population, vicarious immortality through having children and grandchildren assuages the spirit of millions and blunts the edge of mortality for them. **Our great glorification of reproduction, with all the customs and modes that advance it, serves in part as a ceremony to circumvent death as if by magic**."[7](http://muse.jhu.edu.libweb.lib.utsa.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v008/8.3feit.html#_edn7) My argument elaborates how Weinberg's point applies to the debate on same-sex marriage, and expands it to include queer critiques of marriage. In the latter case, queer cultural practices and politics -- chiefly, finding alternatives to marriage -- function as the "children" who provide existential consolation, that is, allow for the conclusion: "He died, but his work lives on."[8](http://muse.jhu.edu.libweb.lib.utsa.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v008/8.3feit.html#_edn8)  My argument, though based on a comparison, does not attribute equal ethical weight to the two sides. To the contrary, I am indebted to queer theory's critique of heteronormativity, and consider my argument as a contribution to queer theory. This contribution is two-fold: first, **I hope to flesh out** one account of heteronormativity that is largely neglected, namely **heteronormativity's reliance on the fear of death. The association of homosexuality with death** is not exhausted by homophobic discourses on HIV/ AIDS. It precedes the emergence of AIDS. As Paul Morrison notes, "the epidemic has resolved, rather than occasioned, a crisis in signification: the crisis that has always been gay sexuality itself...The cultural function of AIDS has been to stabilize, through a specifically narrative or novelistic logic, the truth of gay identity as death or death wish."[9](http://muse.jhu.edu.libweb.lib.utsa.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v008/8.3feit.html#_edn9) Gay men are considered "a population doomed to extinction, anyway."[10](http://muse.jhu.edu.libweb.lib.utsa.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v008/8.3feit.html#_edn10)This logic of lethal homosexuality relies on the childlessness of homosexuality, and thus concerns both lesbians and gay men. **It is this underlying association of sexual reproduction with immortality and citizenship**, which I emphasize in the discussion that follows.

#### Thus, vote neg to adopt queer desire – traditional economic study creates a disembodied and apathetic politic that enables the extermination of those deemed unqualified or refuse participation. Only the alt shifts from a competitive to a cooperative paradigm that transforms social life itself

Heilger 15 (Evangeline Heilger, Mellon Visiting Assistant Professor of Public Discourse in American Sudies at Smith College, “Possibilities of Queer Desires and Economic Bodies (Because ‘The Economy’ Is Not Enough),” GlassHouse Book, 2015)

Working in ‘the economy’ alone couldn’t satisfy our needs. It still cannot. Trashpicking is just one example of an economic innovation by poor, queer, and working-class people in response to laws and policies that ignore the needs of marginalized folks. Yet rarely are these innovations acknowledged in traditional economic study; they become visible only as ‘alternatives to’ capitalism, and only if economic gains are quantifiable. In development studies, such activities are denigrated as ‘economies of affection’, viewed within that framework as a cause for poverty and a hindrance to progress (Escobar 1995; Scott 1996). The full range of economic activities enacted by poor, queer, and working-class people is missing from economic analysis. As noted by Binnie, class is an analytic of power by which people are differentiated from one another on the basis of differential access to material inequalities. Binnie argues for the integration of class into an intersectional analysis of sexuality, and an integration of sexuality into an intersectional analysis of class. This chapter answers Binnie’s call by utilizing an intersectional sexuality–class analysis of different economic innovations by poor, queer, and working-class folks. I have a queer desire. I want to convince you that there are worlds of economic activities that go unnoticed in traditional economic study. My goal is to explain the benefits of those ‘other activities’ – the alternative capitalist and noncapitalist activities – despite their being marked as ‘outside’ wage-earning capitalism. I want you to value them because they matter to people’s survival. To do this, I have to blend some strangely personal queer, poor, and working-class stories with a scholarly attempt to dethrone ‘the economy’ as a unified, closed system. Economic bodies: multiplying vulnerable desires I argue that queer desires inspire people to engage in clusters of nonnormative economic arrangements. These clusters of economic activity can best be understood metaphorically as ‘economic bodies’. I imagine these economic bodies engaging the world much like living and nonliving bodies interacting with other living and nonliving bodies. They take in nutrients and excrete waste. They create and destroy, mimic and hide, hibernate, reproduce, and die (although not necessarily in that order).2 One could consider capitalism as one type of economic body, although certainly not the only type. Economic bodies consist of people, tools, equipment, technical devices, algorithms, as well as non-human substances (e.g. food, plants, minerals, currencies), and actions such as labor, exchanges, and gifting. Economic bodies can exist at a large scale, similarly to how ‘capitalism’ is conceived, or at smaller scales such as micro-economies, families, groups, and individuals.3 The relationships of and between economic bodies can be understood only through engaging a radical analysis that incorporates intersectional analytics of power, including but not limited to gender, race/ethnicity, class, sexuality, nationality, embodiment, and other structural forms of power.4 Why not then use the term ‘actor’ as developed by Callon and Latour in actornetwork theory (also known as ANT)5 (Callon and Latour 1981; Callon 1986, 2005; Latour 1987, 2005)? Latour’s ‘actor’ calls to mind a human being who acts in relation to others, and whose actions can only be understood in connection to others, similarly to how I describe economic bodies functioning relationally to other bodies. Callon describes ‘actors’ as being made up of ‘human bodies but also of prostheses, tools, equipment, technical devices, algorithms, etc.’ (Callon 2005: 4). My description of economic bodies again aligns, although it elaborates further. My observations of green, queer, and alternative economies (Heiliger 2011, 2012, 2013) leads me to articulate three reasons to use the metaphor of ‘bodies’ in this chapter – rather than ‘actor’, ‘economy’, or ‘economic actor’ – to describe an assemblage of people, parts, relationships, and actions that make up economic activities: (1) to pluralize and multiply economic systems; (2) to emphasize the vulnerability of the human bodies living and working under conditions of structural inequality;6 and (3) to utilize the power of metaphor to insert images of vulnerable economies in the minds of readers. While ANT allows for a multiplying and plurality of economies via its concept of ‘networks’, in which multiple ‘actors’ can (inter)act, ANT does not meet the other two characteristics of green/queer/ alternative economies.7 My purpose in using ‘bodies’ as a metaphor is to call to mind both the humans included in economic activities and their vulnerability, a vulnerability mirrored in economic bodies. In Precarious Life, feminist and queer scholar Judith Butler writes that the vulnerability of our bodies is what connects us to one another. Our bodies signal ‘dependency, vulnerability, agency: the skin and flesh expose us to the gaze of others, but also to touch and to violence’ (2004: 26). This vulnerability of bodies is also what creates porousness: a body’s capacity to help and to harm, to be assisted and to be hurt is interwoven with the dependency of bodies (Butler 2004). Economic bodies are equally vulnerable, a point which I address later in this section. I pluralize the metaphor of body, using ‘economic bodies’ (rather than economic body) to counter powerful existing metaphors that promote the idea of a singular, unified, economic totality such as ‘the body of Capitalism’ and ‘the Market’. In making this argument, I align with Gibson-Graham (1996, 2006) in recognizing multiple forms of capitalism and the need to partially dis-unify the powerful ideology of ‘the economy’ or ‘Capitalism’ as a closed system. I also draw on embodiment theorists in recognizing the porousness of bodies, and on queer theorists to articulate how queer desires are pursued through economic bodies. The communal, polymorphous, intersubjective components of queer, feminist, and embodiment theories amplify the metaphor of ‘bodies’. The communal, polymorphous, and intersubjective components also diffuse the idea of a monolithic economic process such as ‘the market’ or ‘capitalism’ into easily recognizable clusters of activity. It becomes possible to see my mother’s teaching job, neighborhood foodsharing, charity clothing donations, and trashpicking as a connected cluster of economic activity that enabled my family’s survival, rather than as a capitalist economic activity (teaching job) and several alternative capitalist and noncapitalist activities. Therefore, reading this metaphor of economic bodies through recent scholarship allows a more complex picture of multiple economic processes, particularly those utilized by poor and other marginalized people as survival strategies. It may appear that the difference between ‘body’ and ‘bodies’ as an economic metaphor is so slight as to be insignificant. Yet recent studies by cognitive scientists Thibodeau and Boroditsky (2011, 2013) demonstrate that even slight, oneword differences in the metaphor used to describe a social or political issue can have profound impacts upon decision-making processes by individuals. Metaphors influence the kinds of solutions we think of and also direct us towards solutions that are consistent with the metaphor (Thibodeau and Boroditsky 2011). Furthermore, metaphors influence our thinking whether or not we are explicitly aware of the metaphor’s role in our decision-making process (Thibodeau and Boroditsky 2013). Therefore, I argue that those who consider all economic activities part of a singular, unified entity such as ‘the economy’ will seek out economic solutions for a singular, unified economy, convinced these are the best solutions regardless of data. If the same people are willing to think of economies as bodies – as lots of different kinds of ‘people’ moving through the world interacting with other ‘people’ – they will look for economic solutions that meet the needs of diverse people who will function best by interacting with others to meet their needs.8 I propose bodies as a metaphor for economies because human bodies are not closed systems; they have complex interactions with other bodies and their environments via border crossings of flesh and consciousness ‘more porous than previously imagined’ (Grosz 2001). My family’s intimate engagement with other people’s refuse is one example of blurred boundaries: between us and other families; between work-for-pay and nonmarket activity; and between what no longer has possibility (trash) and what newly has possibility (trash-turned-treasure). Klapeer and Schönpflug concept of ‘queer commons’ in Chapter 9 of this volume illustrates the porous boundaries of human bodies more fully. If one considers identity as something formed in relation to others, rather than owned by one’s individual self – as argued by Klapeer and Schönpflug – then my family’s class identity and my mother’s queer desires formed in relation to multiple others, both within and adjacent to our class. Human contact is porous in its overlaps: fingerprints left on trash meet fingerprints on trash-turned-treasure,9 creating liminal spaces where my family’s queerly classed identity was formed and re-formed. We interacted with one another as family members sharing the same material and social resources, and we brushed up against those whose trash became a means to my family’s desires and survival. Moira Gatens (1996) argues that the permeability and transitivity of human bodies is possible with any ‘body’ with which we have an affective relation, including corporate social bodies. Pushing out from Gatens, I suggest that economic bodies, as a form of social body, are controlled through human forces, behave in human ways, actively engage with other economic bodies, and utilize forms of social control and power. Bodies are vulnerable to racism, sexism, homophobia, xenophobia, and ableism (Butler 2004), which serve neoliberal aims through their visual and discursive association both with certain human bodies and with nonnormative economic bodies. Nonnormative economic bodies include intelligent, deliberate, and relationship-making processes such as bartering, gifting, trading, careshift collectives, trashpicking, and repurposing. However, these economic activities are frequently racialized, feminized, eroticized, and colonized, imagined in economic discourse as geographically located in the global south or in ‘inferior’ areas of the global north (e.g. inner-city urban or lower-class rural) (Escobar 1995). What we imagine about bodies interrelates with the socio-historic formations of economic realities and current understandings of economic ‘truth’. Thus stereotypes about human bodies are transferred onto what we imagine about economic bodies, and imaginings about economic bodies cross the borders of ‘social bodies’ and become soaked up by the sponginess of the diverse human bodies that labor in the environments of that particular economic body. The bodies of the people in an economy – in an economic body – create meaning for that economy. What we imagine about bodies, our own and others’, has powerful effects on how we relate to those bodies. This transitivity of bodies from material to imagined and back again in simultaneous time, combined with the spongelike ability of bodies to hold multiple meanings, is what I refer to here as the porousness of bodies, both human and economic. How then might we use this porousness of bodies to imagine and engage in productively promiscuous economies? I take up this question in this chapter, offering five examples of porously queer economies that function like human bodies:10 a single-mother desiring beautiful furniture, art, and possibility despite living in poverty; a homeless person making a livelihood on their own terms; medically altering one’s body to better match one’s gender regardless of age or ability to pay; moving cross-country despite being told that persons with disabilities ought to be satisfied with their current living situations; and creating social healing through cultivating queer black intergenerational community across state lines and in the absence of legal ties. I demonstrate that these queer desires inspire complex weavings of market, alternative market, and nonmarket economic activities. These blended activities in pursuit of queer desires are what I call ‘queer economies’. Queer economies I define queer economies as economic bodies animated by queer desires. J. Jack Halberstam defines queerness as referring ‘to nonnormative logics and organizations of community, sexual identity, embodiment, and activity in space and time’ (2005: 6). The ‘queer’ part of queer desires, in this chapter, signals desires shaped by nonnormative logics of community, sexual identity, embodiment, and activity – including economic processes – in space and time. When queer desires motivate economic bodies, we can see that queer economies are shaped and moved by human bodies pursuing queer desires. Because queer economies blend economic activities, these kinds of economic bodies have radical potential for transformation, extending options to survive and thrive through deliberately relational activities such as bartering, trading, careshift collectives, and trashpicking. Another feature of queer economies is their engagement with the erotic. In her seminal essay ‘Toward a Queer Ecofeminism’ (1997), Greta Gaard articulates how Western culture’s devaluing of women, nature, and colonized peoples parallels a devaluation of both queerness and the erotic. Scholars such as Arturo Escobar (1995) and Catherine Scott (1996) have made similar claims that economic development discourse conceptually connects nature, women, indigenous people, and colonized nations. Given Gaard’s eco-feminist theorization that colonization projects attempting to stamp out queer expressions of gender and sexuality simultaneously created a fear of the erotic (1997), I am intrigued by the idea that erotophobia might be preventing us from valuing a range of economic bodies. Can we conceive of nonnormative economies as queerly erotic bodies, sparking and enflaming queer desires? I can imagine them flaming, butch, dyke, crip, leather, trans\*, closeted, polyamorous – even dandy! Yet I wish also to include ‘punks’ and ‘welfare queens’ amongst these queerly defined and imagined economic bodies that inspire queer desire (Cohen 1997: 438). For Cathy J. Cohen, using ‘queer’ politically allows for an expansive definition of identities linked to sexuality, labor, and visibility, a definition that includes those who blur gender/ sexual boundaries as well as unmarried mothers or youth who reject capitalism in favor of anarchy. When our queer economies rub up against the skin of other queer economies, there lies powerful potential for desire and economy outside the (re)productive. I suspect many forms of queer economy go unnoticed because they represent refusals to ‘sleep with’ or ‘be faithful to’ a white hetero-malecapitalism. Thus, just as lesbians and queer women may be punished for refusing sexual availability to heteronormative demands, so too are queer economies deplored, ignored, and decimated for cheeky ‘failures’ to live up to capitalist expectations of profit, efficiency, and progress. One example of a ‘failure’ to properly engage capitalism is that of contemporary trashpickers in LA County. They are typecast as homeless, male, dirty, and incapable of making rational decisions for their own well-being.11 Yet evidence about scavenging demonstrates that at least some of those assumptions are false: collecting recyclables is a consistent means to make money. It requires skill and awareness, planning and follow-through. Trashpicking also requires patience and a certain amount of strength and mobility, although it doesn’t have to be one’s own legs or arms – wheelchairs and grabber-sticks are useful tools (Farrell 2006). Scavenging can be effective in teams or solo, or by collaborating with someone for company while collecting for oneself. Trashpicking allows for making a livelihood on one’s own terms outside of or in addition to work for pay. I list trashpicking as evidence of queer economy, partly because my own queer survival has depended upon it. I see it in action in every place I have ever traveled or lived. Trash also brushes uncomfortably against the erotic, frequently cast in moral terms as a judgment: as dirty, unclean, something to be discarded and not thought about again. Those who engage in close, embodied contact with trash are categorized in the same way as the trash itself: disposable, unclean, and certainly not compatible with a middle- or upper-class status. At the same time, the embrace of ‘trashiness’ in popular culture – understood as a gendered and sexualized cultural performance – leaves me loath to romanticize trashpicking. It is dirty work, but hardly immoral: one might even argue that repurposing keeps valuable resources out of landfills and reduces greenhouse gasses, thereby improving local environments. This is where feminist, queer, and antiracist theories help us to see the language and practices used to denigrate particular human bodies. I propose that when we hear sexist, racist, ableist, classist, homophobic, or trans\*phobic comments, there is an opportunity to observe queer economies that challenge the unity, singularity, and totality of ‘capitalism’. Why do I suggest that economies function like bodies? Contemporary English-language economic discourse frequently touts both the singularity of economy – ‘the economy is sick’ – and economy’s presumed human qualities – ‘the economy is sick’. Existing descriptions of economies as gendered, racialized, disabled, and otherwise anthropomorphized in human terms bolster my claim that economies are already conceived at least partially in embodied terms. The anthropomorphized terms rely on a Western framework that values certain ‘masculine-affiliated’ qualities over ‘feminine-affiliated’ others. Catherine Scott illuminates that the gendered nature of economic discourse is fundamental to imbuing imperial and capitalist regimes with unearned power (1995: 4). Yet within this gendered, anthropomorphized language is ‘the economy’s’ Achilles heel. The tendency to anthropomorphize ‘the economy’ also serves to break down an image of the economy as singular: ‘the’ economy is variously described as masculine, feminine, hard, soft, sick, dying, racialized, reproducing, and lazy. In paying attention to such discourses, one can only conclude that ‘the economy’ consistently changes genders, has multiple personalities, or is not as singular in form as dominant hegemonic discourse would lead us to think. Each of these scenarios holds promise for imagining multiple, diverse economic bodies. Those invested in racism, sexism, ableism, erotophobia, heteronormativity, nationalisms, and colonial power are likely to take my suggestion that there are as many kinds of economies as there are types of human bodies as proof of the superiority of capital ‘c’ Capitalism (Gibson-Graham 1996), much as they take for granted the privileges and power granted to bodies upholding whiteness, maleness, wholeness, productivity, reason, heterosexism, the nation-state, and imperialism. My argument is not for them. I suggest thinking of economies as bodies so that those invested in valuing a range of diverse human bodies and relationships can claim our queer economies – our labors in service of queer desires – with the same ferocity that we claim our diverse, queer selves. Benefits of economic bodies The need for an ‘economies as bodies’ framework grew out of my research on two brands from so-called ‘ethical trade’: Café Femenino® and Product (Red)™ (Heiliger 2011, 2012, 2013). These brands and their campaigns are examples of a larger ‘ethical consumerism’ trend in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, which is a social and economic phenomenon encouraging shoppers, primarily in the global North, to buy products that claim to make the world a better place for all. Gibson-Graham’s dismantling of monolithic ‘Capitalism’ into ‘capitalisms’ (1996) proved critical for describing ways Café Femenino’s Fair Trade economic processes differed from Product (Red)’s version of shopping for a social justice cause. However, once I began to analyse economic activities that blended market, alternative market, and nonmarket transactions, Gibson-Graham’s (1996, 2006) framework of diverse economies no longer effectively described what I observed. One flaw in Gibson-Graham’s description of diverse economies is its limited framing of diverse economies as consisting of transactions/labor/ enterprise, which are conceived as taking place in one of three places: (1) markets, (2) alternative markets, or (3) nonmarkets. Depending upon how economic exchanges are compensated, Gibson-Graham categorize economic activities as either (1) capitalist, (2) alternative capitalist, or (3) noncapitalist. Yet economic bodies do not fit neatly into any one of these categories as strictly capitalist, alternative capitalist, or noncapitalist. Instead, diverse economic bodies – including queer economies – overlap different areas of Gibson-Graham’s framework. The actions of economic bodies may include a combination of capitalist, alternative capitalist, and noncapitalist activities. Here, the metaphor of porousness is useful for understanding the ways that queer economies do not have defined boundaries around market, alternative market, and nonmarket activities. Rather, all three of these activities intermingle in queer economies to support nonnormative people as they pursue queer desires for surviving, thriving, and justice. Gibson-Graham’s framework of diverse economies may not preclude the matrix of queer economies. However, it does not adequately theorize the ways queer economies mix economic activities in pursuit of specific queer desires. Contemporary forms of trade such as ethical consumerism are a merger of capitalisms and alternatives such as Fair Trade (Heiliger 2011; Barnett et al. 2008). Instead of describing Café Femenino as functioning under a ‘subsystem of capitalism’ or Product (Red) as ‘a more ethical capitalism’, the framework of economic bodies catalogues each as its own economic body. Both are new economic bodies formed through an economic marriage. These are two different economies that have adapted quickly in response to critiques of globalization, and which play with one another on a global scale, as well as in local markets. In the coffee world, certified Fair Trade became more entrenched in legal documentation, a result that some considered a hindrance to the transformative possibilities of Fair Trade. In response, other forms of ‘ethical’ trade such as transparent contracts and direct trade spun off from Fair Trade and formed their own economic bodies, some of which continue to engage with formal, certified Fair Trade. Other economic bodies previously considered alternative have modified to more closely resemble conventional trade (e.g. Silk brand soy products). Economic offspring form just as human ones do: through unions sometimes clandestine, occasionally sexy, possibly expensive, but generally without much of note to alert the media. This merger of ideological interests (if not actual practices) and social justice concerns is strange. It strikes me that current bodies of ethical economies operate a bit like idealized liberal American upwardly mobile heterosexual couples: practical, yet kind. When I am asked to comment on Fair Trade’s radical potential, I can only say that I am in favor of Fair Trade in the same way that I am in favor of samesex marriage. Whereas same-sex marriage allows increased legal benefits, protections, and responsibilities to those who participate, certified Fair Trade provides increased access to global markets, some financial protection, and responsibilities to a cooperative or group of farmers. Yet it must be noted that both same-sex marriage and certified Fair Trade provide benefits only to those who fit a limited profile. To participate in same-sex marriage in the United States, one must have a recognized citizenship and a legally recognized gender, only one adult partner who consents to marry you, money for a marriage license, and access to a state government that permits same-sex marriage. Fair Trade is similarly limited to those who are privileged. To participate in Fair Trade, one must have certification of Fair Trade practices, ownership of or access to land to grow crops, membership in a cooperative, and access to income or assets. Fair Trade provides major social and economic benefits to farmers and producers who participate, yet Fair Trade does not intervene in the lives of the very poorest farmers in most cases (Jaffee 2007). Certainly there are social, legal, emotional, and economic benefits of both Fair Trade and gay marriage to those who participate. However, both are solutions that work within existing legal and economic structures, systems designed to privilege heterosexuality, whiteness, existing wealth, able-bodiedness, and the nation-state. It is undeniable that some people – some bodies – will never be qualified to participate in either project, whereas others will not want to. As Lyn Ossome argues in Chapter 7 of this volume, a teleological view of economic justice can blind observers to those who cannot ‘move forward’ in the prescribed way. Ossome additionally questions whether justice can possibly be held within the embrace of capitalism. I want to focus primarily on Ossome’s critique of attempting to locate justice within capitalism, for this leaves room to consider how justice might be struggled for across, through, and around capitalism by those who deliberately engage in queer economies – that is, a variety of capitalist, alternative capitalist, and noncapitalist activities motivated by queer desires – in order to survive and thrive. Therefore, I wish to stipulate that while a framework of economic bodies could chart progressive and liberal economies not usually visible within conventional economic discourse, more is needed to develop this concept in order to locate and describe radical, transformative, queer economies of desire. The next section elaborates on what I mean by queer economic bodies, and articulates ways these economies make queer survival possible. Queer desires multiply economic possibilities As I gather evidence of multiple, interrelated, queer economies through a process of witnessing, storytelling, and internet ‘eavesdropping’ (Facebook), it is obvious that queer people – using Cohen’s radical political potential to include a wide range of individuals – co-create communities and economies blending capitalist, alternative capitalist, and noncapitalist activities into economic bodies. These economic bodies become queer economies if the blended activities are used to pursue queer desires shaped by (as Halberstam describes ‘queer’ to indicate) nonnormative logics of community, sexual identity, embodiment, and activity – including economic processes – in space and time. One example of this blending for queer desires is the Trans\*ition Fund Collective (T\*FC), a Tumblr begun in January, 2012 to ‘highlight the projects of trans\* individuals fundraising for their transition while sharing some awesome trans\*-friendly products and resources. Submissions are always welcome!’ (T\*FC; see website in notes at the end of the chapter). More than 15 individuals posted fundraising efforts and personal stories on T\*FC during the first month, primarily for surgery and follow-up care for themselves or a loved one. Some fundraisers sell pre-made items such as video games, sex toys, or books, while others offer their skills in trade or to personalize a special gift. Most create art such as t-shirts, screen prints, jewelry, and paintings to fund medical costs. The remaining Tumblr posts include resources, information about moderators Ariel and Codi, binder giveaways, and general encouragement of trans\* individuals. I classify the Trans\*ition Fund Collective as a queer economy because it is prompted by the nonnormative desire to medically change one’s body to better match one’s self-identified gender, and it blends capitalist (the medical-industrial complex), alternative capitalist (fundraising via Tumblr), and noncapitalist (bartering, trading, and gifting) economic activities. The T\*FC additionally manifests queer desires by not focusing solely on profit; its features include strengthening ties between individuals and their supporters via Tumblr. Its use of multiple economic processes (art, bartering, trade, gifting, collaborating, fundraising) alongside an engagement in the medical-industrial complex is an unconventional kind of economic arrangement, an economic body neither fully inside nor wholly outside a conventional profitmaking capitalism. Additionally, its relationship-building (supporting, connecting, communicating, promoting) across in-person and internet interactions provides a model of community engagement and transformation for other trans\* people. Porously queer economies One reason for the intermingling of various economic activities in a porous queer economy may be that the politically queer humans laboring in queer economies are themselves diverse and experience intersecting forms of systemic oppression that must be met with multiple forms of resistance. Engaging in different forms of economic activity – in different kinds of enterprise – is one strategy for resistance and survival. So, too, is engaging in a variety of relationships and forms of community. An example of a queer economy pursuing ‘nonnormative logics and community’ is a Tumblr called To the Other Side of Dreaming (TTOSOD; see website in notes at the end of the chapter). TTOSOD documents the journey of disability justice/transformative justice activists Mia Mingus and Stacey ‘Cripchick’ Milbern to move together from the US south to the Bay Area of California, despite immense economic and social limitations to mobility faced by people with disabilities. In pursuing this endeavor, they said to their communities in the blogosphere: [We] have decided to live together and create/cultivate interdependent queer disabled korean diasporic radical women of color home together. We are embarking on a journey together to put pieces of disability justice into practice, love each other and live on the other side of dreaming. A huge part of this is our need, as crips, as queers, and women of color, as korean (and all) diasporic people; we need each other and we need you. (TTOSOD) Mingus and Milbern ask for assistance finding affordable, accessible housing and creating a community care collective in Berkeley, California, to assist with Milbern’s needs until the state of CA approves her application and provides home assistive care. They transgress complicated state regulations and social norms that make it difficult for persons with disabilities to move. They explicitly name love and healing a variety of inter-related traumas as part of their relationship-building. The response towards To the Other Side of Dreaming in the first two weeks was remarkable: members of their online and in-person community offered advice and connections to affordable housing and began creating a schedule for a careshift collective. Some online community members sold books, while another friend organized an Etsy shop to raise money for their move and transition. The kinds of support To the Other Side of Dreaming required to prepare to move across the United States differs from the kinds of day-to-day support needed after moving and settling in. Questions of quantity of assistance as well as quality of relationships are critical. Enough people have to be involved to avoid burnout – and those who commit to assisting need to be honest about what they can contribute and for how long. Some ‘allies’ stuck around to provide access for less than six months, perhaps not knowing or caring how their absence can shift a situation of thriving to one of surviving. TTOSOD, as queer economy, relies particularly on creativity, flexibility, and interdependence, as well as access to money, able-bodied persons with access, and state services. In Chapter 7 of this volume, Lyn Ossome challenges the teleological view of most discussions of economic justice, and her arguments apply here: that TTOSOD remains a functioning queer economy, but one that defies the linear narrative of progress and invites the question whether rubbing queer economies against other queer economies is always or necessarily pleasurable, particularly when some economies operate from greater privileges. Queer economies, queer relationships Like other economic bodies, queer economies engage in relationship-making and a variety of economic processes for survival of nonnormative human bodies. Some of these processes may look like a poor imitation of capitalisms – for example, so-called ‘economies of affection’ with activities such as gifting, trading, bartering, trashpicking, and repurposing. However, I would argue they no more mock capitalisms than a dildo mocks a penis. Each of these noncapitalist exchanges offers relational pleasures and responsibilities. Profit-making is not the sole point of these economic activities. Relationships and tool-usage matter as much as form and purpose. Gibson-Graham (1999) and Escobar (1995) reveal that a Western ideological framework invisibilizes some economic activities, while denigrating and calling for the destruction of others. Success and survival within this context become linked to one’s ability to perform as an ideal ‘rational’ economic actor for capitalism. As Escobar has argued, ‘through economic sciences (classical political economy) and broader philosophical conceptions (derived from the Enlightenment, utilitarianism, empiricism), this system produced a certain subjectivity, namely, that embodied in the modern producing subject’ (2005: 142). Cultivating a sense of the profit motive was seen as a crucial component of becoming an ideal producer for the global market, while gift-giving, charity, bartering, and other forms of noncapitalist exchange were ridiculed as being non-rational and non-productive (Escobar 1995; Harvey 2005; Scott 1995). My fifth example of a queer economy embraces many ‘nonrational’ economic activities. Mobile Homecoming (MBHC) is designed by Dr. Alexis Pauline Gumbs, black queer feminist poet and revolutionary, and her partner, Julia Wallace, revolutionary black queer filmmaker, to record the stories of queer black elders in the US. They reached out to online and in-person communities to raise funds for a mobile home to travel to the homes of queer black elders to conduct interviews. Gumbs and Wallace build relationships and raise money through holding freedom schools, selling poetry and books, creating films and teaching resources available online for free and for sale, sharing meals, asking for donations of money, love, and support, and connecting with other queer radicals in North Carolina, USA, and around the globe. According to Gumbs and Wallace’s MBHC (see website in notes at the end of the chapter), the point of their work is to heal, love, and honor black queers, and to support other revolutionary relationships. MBHC is explicitly not a nonprofit. They write: We understand that the modes of survival in our black queer communities which include: – social support organizing – artistic creativity – spiritual transformation – revolutionary interpersonal relationships are our key resources as we transform the meaning of life. (MBHC website) MBHC is queer economy for its intentional mixing of monetary exchange, creative resourcefulness, and deliberate community-building meant to generate love and structural healing. Celebrating the full range of black queerness fundamentally shapes MBHC and affiliated projects. ‘Community’ is defined not by geographic boundaries, nor by boundaries around race or gender, but by reaching out to like-minded social revolutionaries working for justice. There are thousands of people who belong to Gumbs and Wallace’s community – their project of celebrating black queer love and honoring queer intergenerational connection through listening projects and recording history clearly speaks to many. This is one example of how queer economies function – through connections, networks of respect and mutuality, and by speaking truth to power. Because ‘the economy’ is never enough: desiring (more) queer economic bodies In this chapter, I analyse five examples of queer economies to begin to think through what makes queer economies queer, and what makes queer economies valuable. In considering what makes queer economies queer, first, they are a type of economic body animated by queer desires. Economic bodies are inherently relational. Second, queer economies differ conceptually from ‘the economy’, because they are not a singular, unified entity like ‘Capitalism’ – they are multiple and allow us to ‘have some more’. Third, queer economies differ from Gibson-Graham’s framing of multiple economies (as capitalisms, alternative capitalisms, or noncapitalisms) because queer economies – like many economic bodies – weave together two or more kinds of economic activities in pursuit of queer desires. Finally, queer economies function differently from other economic bodies because they focus on nonnormative arrangements of community and relationship-building while pursuing queer desires. The value of queer economies comes from this bundle of characteristics. The relationship-making aspects of queer economies are as important as their plurality and their blending of economic activities. Relationship-making – between people and between economies – enables queer economies to sidestep larger structural forces that disenfranchise queer people and thwart queer desires. Specifically, TTOSOD and MBHC name desires such as love and healing personal and structural wounds as key goals motivating the activities of their economic bodies. Attempting to diffuse or heal structural harms is also clear in T\*FC’s use of Tumblr to provide emotional support for trans\* youth who experience social pressure to pretend to be the sex/gender assigned to them at birth. Scavengers like my family and trashpickers in Los Angeles have a nonnormative relationship with trash, which pushes back against structural norms that insist ‘nice people’ spend money to pursue their desires or that those who don’t have money don’t deserve to thrive. One reason queer economies might be difficult to identify and describe is that many are utilizing forms of alternative and noncapitalist exchange that are typically categorized as non-economic. Queer economies work differently from how we have been taught that capitalisms function, even as queer economies operate through, within, and outside them. Therefore, queer economies have the potential to create justice through desires for nonnormative logics of community, sexual identity, embodiment, and activity – including economic processes – in space and time.12 This requires flexibility and creativity, as well as the pleasurable and often-difficult work of building relationships and being accountable for our actions. Re-theorizing economies as bodies is not merely an intellectual exercise – I mean to multiply our options for engaging in economic activities. Naming and describing queer economies makes clear the unconscious links between economies-as-bodies and the embodied persons laboring within them in service of queer desires. So I ask: what queer desires move your economic bodies? What relationships must you engage in to manifest your desires? With whom will your economic bodies collaborate, flirt, merge, avoid, fight, make up, bargain, or trade? What – or who – will your queer economies long for? Applying our ideas about human bodies leads to greater recognition of – and perhaps participation in – economies already animated by queer desires and justice. What will your queer economies do? Because ‘the economy’ simply isn’t enough to hold all your queer possibilities.

### 2

#### CP Text: Istadus unidos ukampirus jan masi pashna.

#### J’ani amuyu

Belcourt 17 (Billy-Ray Belcourt is from Driftpile Cree First Nation. He is a PhD student in the Department of English and Film Studies at the University of Alberta. “The Optics of the Language: How Joi T. Arcand Looks with Words.” 8-29-17. <https://canadianart.ca/features/optics-language-joi-t-arcand-looks-words/> //shree)

What did Bushby see? In his formulation, “one” brings into focus a sinister optic, where “optic” is the lens or filter by which one looks and from this looking ropes what is seen into an encounter humming with all sorts of potential. Bushby’s is an optic that mediates the interpellative call “one” seeks to enact—it is a part of the grammar of settler horror. “One” is thus a modality by which we, the ante-Canada, those of us who bear that which is prior to and beneath Canada, are racialized and roped into a representational field where all things, like trailer hitches, can be put to violent use. We cannot survive in the visual register of “one.” Words are worldly; not just in the sense that they proliferate and float up into the sky and become cloud-like. Words world too. Words like “one” incubate death-worlds (see Achille Mbembe’s 2003 essay “Necropolitics”) inside which those of us who look like Kentner are made to inhabit modes of enfleshment that fix the stares of the grim reapers of the present. On the other hand, some of us recruit words in the name of something like freedom. We might call this duality the double-bind of enunciation. How do we refuse a savage call to being with a more spacious one? Joi T. Arcand is a photo-based artist and industrial sculptor from Muskeg Lake Cree Nation, and she knows that words, that letter forms, shapes and glyphs, “change the visual landscape,” that they are how we go about practicing new ways of looking. Words are emotional architectures, and Arcand calls hers “Future Earth.” In her 2015 book The Argonauts, Maggie Nelson tends to a debate about whether words do or do not potentiate. She takes up a claim of a partner’s that words do nothing but nominalize, and what is left unnamed is subject to a host of horrors. Nelson, however, holds out more hope for words; she contends that they are “good enough,” that how one speaks makes all of the difference and that words can, following Deleuze, incite “the outline of a becoming.” Bushby’s angered vocalization of a genre of non-being—where “one” is the refusal of a name and the humanity that comes with it—is evidence of the terrible mechanics of language. But, it is in opposition to this linguistic state of killability, this metaphysics and rhetoric of coloniality, that Arcand articulates a grammar of subjectivity vis-à-vis the time and space of a native future. Here on Future Earth is a series of photographs that Arcand produced in 2010. In a phone interview, Arcand explained to me that this is where her photo-based practice and her interest in textuality synched. Arcand wants us to think about these photographs as documents of “an alternative present,” of a future that is within arm’s reach. For this series, Arcand manipulated signs and replaced their slogans and names with Cree syllabics. By doing this, Arcand images something of a present beside itself and therefore loops us into a new mode of perception, one that enables us to attune to the rogue possibilities bubbling up in the thick ordinariness of everyday life. Arcand wanted to see things “where they weren’t.” Hers is not a utopian elsewhere we need to map out via an ethos of discovery. Rather, Arcand straddles the threshold of radical hope. She asks us to orient ourselves to the world as if we were out to document or to think back on a future past. That is, Arcand rendered these photographs with a pink hue and a thick, round border, tapping into what she calls “the signifiers of nostalgia.” Importantly, these signifiers are inextricably bound to the charisma of words, to the emotional life of the syllabics. The syllabics are what enunciate; they potentiate a performance of world-making that does not belong to the mise-en-scene of settlement. It is this mise-en-scene of settlement that Arcand conjures to then obliterate, which is to say that her photographs evince a prairie world that is crowded with meaning, meaning that belongs differently to the logic of terra nullius (that a place exists without history or politics prior to European settlement) and to myths of Indian savagery and degeneracy. It is against this system of signs that Arcand opens the prairies up to radical resignification. It is where we build a future atop the decayed remains of coloniality. Perhaps Here on Future Earth visually captures the tempos of “Indian time,” which is always a scene of errant temporality. Indian time is less about the absence of rhythm and more about an inability to fix or to analytically hold up the rhythmic as a mode of feral movement itself. Words like “one” are spun such that they stomp us into the rut of social death. But: Indian time evinces an otherwise kinetics. In Here on Future Earth, this kinetics is energized by the textual, by the stories that they tell, and their visual culture. The modified signs exploit our ability to look; that we see them and conceptualize them as out of place or untimely is how we transport ourselves to a different time, to a place governed by Indian time. The syllabics themselves map a visual field. This is what Arcand calls “the optics of the language.” It is around these words that sociality orbits. This thematic persists in Arcand’s latest project, a set of large neon signs that light up Cree words like keyam. For Arcand, all of her engagements with the Cree language are partly elegiac. She is mourning language loss, but puts this negative affect to rebellious use to signify a world-to-come. Like the syllabics in Here on Future Earth, the bright signs prop up affective structures for a time and place where our relations to Cree are not always-already bound up in performances of grief. In one sign, Arcand translates the English phrase “I don’t have the words” into Cree. “I don’t have the words” is a paradoxical speech act; it uses words to announce their absence. These signs are installed in gallery spaces where Arcand’s work is commissioned; one was recently installed at the second gesture of the Wood Land School at the SBC Gallery of Contemporary Art in Montreal, another outside the Walter Phillips Gallery in Banff. These signs interrupt the visual terrain of the gallery, as if welcoming onlookers to a new world, to a new geographic form. The signs something like kinship around a common wordlessness in the service of a new world-making praxis. These photographs and signs, then, are all relics of a future past. They emerge from something of an anthropological interest in a future-in-the-present, in the affects of Indian time. Arcand thus writes the world wrong so that she can write it anew.

### 3

#### Interpretation- the private sector excludes companies that contract with the government

#### “Anticompetitive practices” are committed by firms

Wells 16 – Executive Notes Editor, Washington University Global Studies Law Review, J.D., Washington University in St. Louis

Todd Wells, “Exploring the Space for Antitrust Law in the Race for Space Exploration,” Washington University Global Studies Law Review, Vol. 15, 2016, LexisNexis

Antitrust law attempts to fight anti-competitive actions. "Anticompetitive practices refer to a wide range of business practices in which a firm or group of firms may engage in order to restrict inter-firm competition to maintain or increase their relative market position and profits without necessarily providing goods and services at a lower cost or of higher quality." The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Glossary of Statistical Terms, Anticompetitive Practices http://stats.oecd.org.proxy.library.georgetown.edu/glossary/detail.asp?ID=3145. Obviously, with such a broad definition of anticompetitive practices, many types of actions can fall under the regulation of anticompetitive law. This can cover forms of collusion, price fixing, bid rigging, bid suppression, complementary bidding, bid rotation, subcontracting, and market divisions. Price Fixing, Bid Rigging, and Market Allocation Schemes: What They Are and What to Look For, U.S. Dep't of Justice, http://www.justice.gov/atr/ public/guidelines/211578.htm. An even broader approach would put patents under antitrust law. "All of these developments, in Congress and the Courts, are in the spirit of harmonizing patent and antitrust law, generally in the direction of subsuming patent law under antitrust law. From the perspective of providing clarity and certainty for those who are the targets of patent and antitrust suits, harmonization has much appeal." Robin Feldman, Patent and Antitrust: Differing Shades of Meaning,13 Va. J.L. & Tech. 1, 7 (2008).

#### “by” denotes the actor of the practice

Cambridge dictionary (https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/by)

by

preposition

used to show the person or thing that does something:

The motorcycle was driven by a tiny bald man.

We were amazed by what she told us.

I'm reading some short stories (written) by Chekhov.

The book was translated by a well-known author.

I felt frightened by the anger in his voice.

#### Private sector means not the state---the affirmative regulates contracts between the government and private companies not private sector business practices

Investopedia 20 “Private Sector” THE INVESTOPEDIA TEAM, Fact checked by MARCUS REEVES, Reviewed by THOMAS BROCK, December 25, 2020, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/private-sector.asp

What is the Private Sector?

The private sector is the part of the economy that is run by individuals and companies for profit and is not state controlled. Therefore, it encompasses all for-profit businesses that are not owned or operated by the government. Companies and corporations that are government run are part of what is known as the public sector, while charities and other nonprofit organizations are part of the voluntary sector.

#### The government is the source of the anticompetitive practices!

CRS 21 “Defense Primer: Department of Defense Contractors” Congressional Research Service, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/IF10600.pdf

Throughout its history, the Department of Defense (DOD) has relied on contractors to support a wide range of military operations. A defense contractor, as defined by the Code of Federal Regulations, is “any individual, firm, corporation, partnership, association, or other legal non-Federal entity that enters into a contract directly with the DOD to furnish services, supplies, or construction” (see 32 C.F.R. 158.3, “Definitions”).

#### Vote neg for limits and ground---their aff allows a change in government & voluntary policy -- more than triples the case load and takes viable counterplan and circumvention warrants.

### Case

#### The only outcome of their advocacy is monstrous global militarism and incalculable violence---vote Neg to give up the impulse for policy relevance.

Jackson 16 – Richard Jackson, Director of the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, the University of Otago and Former Professor of International Politics at Aberystwyth University, “To Be or Not To Be Policy Relevant? Power, Emancipation and Resistance in CTS Research”, Critical Studies on Terrorism, Vol. 9, No. 1, p. 120-125

Today, it is nothing more than common sense that academic research ought to be “policy relevant”, and academics have a duty to make themselves available as “expert” advisers to policymakers and practitioners. In fact, within the academy, achieving some form of “impact” on the policymaking or policy enactment process is held up as a kind of gold standard for academic research. The opportunities to engage with, or speak directly to, the powerful are highly sought after by scholars (and their institutional managers), and reflect a widely-held belief that one of the prescribed roles of academics is to assist the state in its regulation and management of society. Certainly, within International Relations more broadly, and security studies and terrorism studies more specifically, engagement with powerful officials and influence on policy is viewed as a key goal of academic research, and scholars who gain access to power in this way are held in high esteem by their peers and society in general – notwithstanding critical questions surrounding the politics of security “expertise” (see Berling and Bueger 2015).

Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) has broadly followed in this path since the beginning, adopting the normal academic priority of trying to ensure that its research goes beyond critique and has “policy relevance”. In an early volume laying out the new CTS research agenda, we stated that there was a need to continue developing and articulating the CTS normative agenda … within the confines of the need for both critical distance from the status quo and policy relevance. […] In particular, CTS scholars will need to think through the practicalities, ethics, and modalities of negotiating the delicate balance between normatively-oriented independent scholarship that promotes emancipation and the security of humans in general, and the demands of being “policy relevant” … We believe that it is possible to maintain access to power and critical distance at the same time … In addition, we feel that the current political and intellectual climate, in which there is growing disappointment with the effects and outcomes to date of the “war on terror”, and where security practitioners are actively searching for new ideas and approaches to thinking about counter-terrorism, provides a ripe moment for critically-oriented scholars to offer their knowledge and expertise. (Jackson, Breen Smyth, and Gunning 2009, 235, emphasis added)

Looking back, I would suggest that there was always a potential contradiction, or point of tension, between the contrasting aspirations for policy relevance and access to power, and CTS’s commitment to emancipation and critical distance. For example, in the same volume, we stated that a commitment to emancipation implied a commitment to praxis as organic intellectuals to help bring about concrete utopias out of the fissures and contradictions of existing structures …; a continuous process of “immanent critique” of existing power structures and practices in society; the moral and intellectual questioning of the instrumental rationality paradigm of political violence …; the prioritising of human security over national security and working towards minimising all forms of physical, structural, and cultural violence …; and the serious scholarly and practical exploration of non-violence, conflict transformation, and reconciliation as practical alternatives to terrorist and counter-terrorist violence. From this perspective, we believe that CTS is at heart an anti-hegemonic project, and a kind of “outsider theorising” which seeks to go “beyond problem-solving within the status quo and instead …to help engage through critical theory with the problem of the status quo” (Booth 2007). (Jackson, Breen Smyth, and Gunning 2009, 225)

It now seems clear that believing we could balance access to policymakers and having policy relevance with prioritising human security, critiquing the use of violence (including by the state), the promotion of nonviolence, “outsider theorising”, and antihegemony, was a little naïve. At the very least, it failed to fully appreciate that such a stance rested on a series of implicit assumptions about states as benign institutions and policymaking as a fairly open, rational process.

Moreover, I would argue that since we wrote this, both the global context of counterterrorism, and our understanding of its nature, have changed greatly, and as a consequence, the contradictions are now too sharp to maintain any kind of balance between our stated aspirations. In the first instance, the past few years have seen the mutation of counterterrorism from a fairly narrowly-defined set of security measures designed to deal with the threat of sub-state political violence in individual states, to a monstrous global machine implicated in military invasions, wars, militarisation and arms races, rendition and torture, drone assassination, mass surveillance, the suspension of law, the policing of thought crime, social engineering of entire populations, and the suppression of increasingly widely-defined forms of dissent and protest – among others. These aspects of counterterrorism are well documented in the broader CTS literature, and earlier volumes of this journal.

Moreover, all of this has been done in the name of preserving a global system dominated by entrenched economic and political interests. Further, such an assessment does not include indirect effects such as: regional instability, the rise of violent groups like Islamic State, the intensification of sectarian rivalries, increased flows of refugees and displaced persons, the undermining of numerous peace processes, and the diversion of scarce resources from humanitarian and development activities to security. Overall, there is no question that counterterrorism – notably, the so-called “war on terror” since 2001 – has killed and injured over a million people (immeasurably more than those killed by substate terrorism), caused incalculable suffering directly to millions more, put obstacles in the way of progressive movements and conflict transformation, and is one of the most effective tools of hegemonic domination by Western states in the present era, and of domination in general by state ruling elites against their own populations. In short, it is not too extreme to say that the global counterterrorism regime is, in its philosophy, practice, and effects, inherently violent, oppressive, and life-diminishing; it is a set of practices that is deeply anti-emancipatory, anti-human, and regressive. Certainly, no one would argue that contemporary counterterrorism fits the definition of emancipation adopted by CTS, in which emancipation “seeks the securing of people from those oppressions that would stop them from carrying out what they would freely choose to do, compatible with the freedom of others. It provides … progress for society, and a practice of resistance against oppression. Emancipation is the philosophy, theory, and politics of inventing humanity” (Booth 2007, 112). Counterterrorism is today the direct antithesis of emancipation.

In such conditions, where counterterrorism causes widespread suffering and is an obstacle to progressive change and social justice, it can be argued that working directly with state counterterrorism is akin to medical professionals who collaborate with torturers in an effort to improve prisoner welfare; while there may be some benefit to individual prisoners who perhaps suffer less as a consequence, the broader impact of their participation is the perpetuation and legitimisation of the overall system of torture, and their involvement does nothing to fundamentally change an inherently immoral set of practices. In other words, it can be argued that scholars who work with the state in either designing or enacting its counterterrorism practices – through advising practitioners working on the implementation of counter-radicalisation programmes, for example – may result in reducing harms to some potential victims. However, the overall primary effect is the legitimisation and perpetuation of the broader system of counterterrorism, rather than its dismantling or destruction.

I would suggest that under these conditions it is virtually impossible to maintain an ethical commitment to human rights, human welfare, non-violence, and progressive politics – that is, emancipation – while simultaneously participating in an inherently violent and counter-emancipatory regime of counterterrorism. It does not seem possible to work simultaneously for state counterterrorism (which is inherently violent, physically and epistemically, and aimed at maintaining a system of elite domination), and human emancipation.

In addition, I would argue that what we have learned about counterterrorism policy and practice in the years since the establishment of CTS strongly suggests that the “ripe moment” for offering expertise and guidance to policymakers and practitioners which we perceived at the time is now gone, if it ever really existed. In contrast, all the evidence we have from the last 14 years of the war on terror clearly show that policymakers are, for the most part, uninterested in evidence-based policy, or in the rigorous evaluation of counterterrorism policy, or in listening to reasonable, evidence-based suggestions about how to more effectively, and more ethically, respond to acts of terrorism (see, for example, Mueller and Stewart 2011). Rather, what we have increasingly witnessed is state officials and security practitioners – for a variety of sometimes but not always well-meaning reasons, including becoming trapped in the “epistemological crisis of counterterrorism” (Jackson 2015a) – engaging in ever-more egregious and nefarious practices, frequently followed by attempts to cover up their abuses when public scrutiny brings them to light. New allegations and evidence of human rights abuses seem to emerge weekly, and wasteful, ethically dubious, and ineffective counterterrorism practices are only grudgingly abandoned (such as torture and mass surveillance) under enormous pressure from human rights activists, public opinion, and judicial review.

I would add that these kinds of abuses are not the result of “a few bad apples” within the counterterrorism system, but are the direct consequence of the system itself; they are inherent to the system. In this context, it is extremely naïve to think that CTS scholars will first of all, be invited into the real chambers of power where policymaking occurs, and second, that once in the chamber, their suggestions will be taken seriously. The fact is that CTS scholars have warned and criticised and made alternative suggestions for years now, without any measurable effect; CTS scholars, by and large, have no voice in the current counterterrorism system. It is probably closer to reality that so-called “terrorism expertise” (most often of the more mainstream, orthodox kind) is primarily called upon and utilised by the state to legitimise already decided courses of action and to bolster its public reputation. Once again, there is here an ethical dilemma surrounding participating in what is largely a performance designed primarily to bolster and uphold state power, rather than protect or emancipate people.

Finally, I would argue that the effect of holding up “policy relevance” as a measure of good research can, and most often does, have a distorting effect on the research itself. This is because framing the end-point of the research in this way pushes us towards asking particular kinds of questions and looking for particular kinds of evidence. Primarily, it frames the research question in a “problem-solving” mode, conforming to the way that policymakers view reality. To illustrate this, consider the potential impact of asking, “How could my research assist counterterrorism officials to respond to terrorism more effectively?”, compared to the question, “How could my research assist ordinary people or oppressed groups achieve greater social justice and emancipation?” Research on the same topic, but pursued under the rubric of these two contrasting questions, will result in quite different sets of findings, I would argue.

It is for these reasons – the inherently oppressive nature of contemporary counterterrorism, the legitimising role of academics in maintaining state power, the potentially distorting effects of policy-oriented research, and the incompatibility of a commitment to both emancipation and the maintenance of the current elite-dominated system – that I have come to believe that the time for any kind of significant engagement with policymakers and counterterrorism practitioners is now over. The pitfalls and dangers for normatively oriented and committed scholars are too great to warrant risking it. We are now in a historical period where blunt and sustained opposition to the war on terror and state counterterrorism, plus the broader questioning of neoliberal capitalism and the state, is an overriding ethical imperative, in order to protect the innocent from foreseeable harms, advance social justice, respond to climate change, and promote emancipation.

So what is the alternative? What should we do? Are there no circumstances under which we should engage with the state, or with policymakers and practitioners? What I would like to suggest is not a prescriptive prohibition on trying to produce “policy relevant” research, or engaging with policymakers and practitioners. There may be scholars who genuinely do believe they can avoid the obvious dangers, maintain their commitment to emancipation, and feel that they are making a positive difference to counterterrorism policies and practices. It may also be that in some circumstances, officials genuinely will listen to academic suggestions and put them into practice (although I suspect the possibility of this occurring only applies at the levels of politics furthest from the centre of power). I therefore don’t want to say that we should refuse all invitations or opportunities to engage with the state; each instance should be evaluated on its merits. I also don’t want to say that state officials or security practitioners are bad people who we shouldn’t ever associate with; most are honest, intelligent individuals working in a flawed, dysfunctional system. Instead of a blanket prohibition then, what I suggest instead is that CTS scholars try and adopt a new broader orientation and set of priorities, and then see how this might change our research and scholarly practices. In other words, I am arguing for an epistemic reorientation and a value re-commitment, which I believe will then result in the sociological transformation of our practice. Such a reorientation comes, first of all, from re-committing ourselves to a strong and relentless “immanent critique” of the current system and its oppressive power structures, and avoiding any sense of deference towards, or privileging of, existing power structures.

In fact, given the role the state plays in maintaining the current system of elite domination, its proven record of power abuse and impunity, and its violent propensities, as well as the failure of the mainstream media to perform its watchdog role (at least in relation to security and foreign policy), it is our duty to adopt a sceptical attitude and to continuously hold them to account – to be part of an “anti-hegemonic project”, as we expressed it in the early days of CTS. From this perspective, there is room to engage with the state, as long as it is on the basis of highlighting the state’s crimes and plainly stating that state actors need to end their violence, structural and direct, and begin to dismantle the inherently counter-productive and counter-emancipatory counterterrorism regime. In other words, we are willing to engage with the state in the process of deconstructing the counterterrorism system, and undoing the harm caused by the war on terror. Clearly, such a confrontational and critical attitude is somewhat at odds with the current dominant attitude of embracing policy relevance as the gold standard and pinnacle of academic practice. It will require mental discipline to consider state officials, policymakers, and security practitioners as agents of a violent and oppressive system, rather than as benign actors in an institution committed to the social good.

Second, we should our embrace our “outsider theorising”, “anti-hegemonic” identity, recognising that in truth we have no voice in the structures of power anyway, nor are we likely to ever have any real influence over the way state power operates. Again, this involves giving up our institutionally-conditioned aspirations towards a state-based form of “impact”, and our continuous striving to catch the eye of the powerful and perhaps be invited into the inner sanctum where “real” power is wielded. Rather, we should commit to the outsider’s role of critic and conscience, radical and rebel, dissident and protestor, prophet crying in the wilderness. In part, this involves a recognition of a point that Noam Chomsky and others have made for many years, namely, that there is little point in “speaking truth to power”, because the powerful already know the truth and they don’t particularly want to hear it. Therefore, it is better to seek to work with progressive forces outside of the existing structures of power, not least because this is historically how significant change has frequently been engendered. While broad social movements have often forced the political classes to enact social change (most recently, we might consider the marriage equality, environmental, and racial equality movements), it is rare to find cases where well-meaning insiders to power systems succeeded in generating progressive social change.

Lastly, I would suggest that the reorientations I am suggesting here can be accommodated within the original concept and values of emancipation, which as Booth reminds us, “provides … a practice of resistance against oppression” (2007, 112, emphasis added). In other words, as I have argued elsewhere in relation to peace studies, I believe that “an explicit commitment to adopting the language, ontology, epistemology and praxis of ‘resistance’ could potentially reinvigorate the critical orientation of the field” (2015b, 31). Apart from the numerous potential theoretical benefits which would come from adopting a “resistance studies” framework within CTS (terrorism and counterterrorism are forms of resistance, after all), such a framework would also reorient our academic research and practice towards the powerless, the oppressed, the subaltern, the more numerous victims of counterterrorism and state terrorism – rather than towards the powerful, the influential, the state. Instead of thinking about how our research could be useful to the state and its policymakers, it would force us to think about how our research could be useful to social movements, human rights groups, protestors, oppressed groups, and humanity at large. Instead of valuing rubbing shoulders with the powerful and having “policy relevance” as the gold standard, it would make us value working with local communities and progressive groups and movements; it would provide a new aspirational gold standard based on how relevant and useful our research was to ongoing struggles for social justice. This would, I believe, over time, help CTS as a field to find a more balanced and consistent relationship to power than we currently have, and a better position or standpoint from which to engage in research and political practice.

#### 99/100 senators voted for the invasion of Iraq, political pressure makes intervention inevitable even

Zelizer 14 (Julian Zelizer is a professor of history and public affairs at Princeton University., “Can Obama avoid mission creep in Iraq?”, http://www.cnn.com/2014/06/19/opinion/zelizer-mission-creep/)

Why does it prove so difficult to contain operations? Why is mission creep so common? Most importantly, war inherently involves many moving parts, most of which are not under the control of the commander in chief.

Often, as was the case with South Vietnam in the 1960s, allies prove difficult to rely on and cause problems of their own, while opponents frequently are capable of causing far more trouble than expected, even when they have fewer resources than the United States.

Although a mission might seem small at first, the logic of war creates new dangers for advisers or soldiers in the field and makes it very difficult to avoid pouring more resources into a problem.

Domestic politics also matter. Very often the political pressures to escalate intensify once a president has committed forces to a region, particularly in the early years of a conflict. Both parties, as was the case with the Cold War and in the aftermath of 9/11, vie to be the party that will be tougher against the nation's adversary. Neither party wants to look weak, to be the party, as Republicans said of Democrats after 1949, that lost China to communism.

Finally, in this day and age, many of the missions that involve U.S. troops are not clear-cut or well defined. It is unclear what victory even looks like anymore. During the war against terrorism, the United States has found itself drawn into operations where it is trying to create stable government structures that will not house terrorist networks or work on a continuous basis in countries to fight against fundamentalist forces. None of this lends itself to a quick end or to limited involvement.

President Obama might get lucky and find that the advisers he sent to do the job get the job done. But history shows that mission creep can also happen quite quickly, and the President could easily find himself forced to send more troops than he expected into the quagmire of Iraq.

#### The aff’s tactical shift in the form of warfare through a reduction of ground presence instantiates the neoliberal ideologies that configure the planet for US domination—the impact is unending warfare

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Such portrayals evoke and rephrase the ‘Japan as Number 1’ trope, popularised in the early 1980s.10 Now, however, China has been substituted for Japan, with Joseph Stiglitz recently proclaiming ‘The Chinese Century’. Offering an economistic summation of China’s status as the number one economy (in terms of GDP), Stiglitz further claimed that ‘an essential point to remember’ is that ‘the bedrock strength of the US has always rested less on hard military power than on “soft power,” most notably its economic influence.’11 In addition to the fact that ‘economic influence’ does not fall from the ether (rather, it is, in essence, a form of ‘hard’ power), Stiglitz disregarded the vast interdependencies between military capacities, diplomatic leverage and national economic power.12 While focusing on simple metrics such as the shifting hierarchy of national GDPs (thereby ignoring more meaningful measures, such as the surging production networks of US-based transnational corporations), the ‘declinists’ have taken little account of the USA’s surging interventionist tendencies and the new political economy of military power arising from the relentless pursuit of global militarism.13 The USA has long exercised its competitive advantage in military power to enhance its diplomatic clout, as well as to advantageously reposition its national industrial and financial base. As Brooks et al. noted: ‘Deep engagement allows the United States to institutionalize its alliances and wrap its hegemonic rule in a rulesbased order. The result is to make the US alliance system – especially among its core liberal members – far more robust and harder to challenge than if the United States were to disengage.’14 But recently the pace of such martial efforts has accelerated, as US policy makers strive for both paradigm maintenance, including continuance of vast economic rents from suzerainty over the Middle East, and geopolitical expansion within the periphery – including, particularly, in Ukraine.

In 2011, at its peak moment, the USA had 101,000 troops operating in Afghanistan, pursuing the longest war in US history. Widespread dismay regarding the inconclusive nature of this campaign, coupled with the dismal results of the Second Persian Gulf war (2003–11) temporarily created a new climate of caution regarding the efficacy of military intervention. Such circumstances contributed to cuts in Pentagon programmes in early 2013, under a budget policy known as ‘sequestration’. The USA announced further troop withdrawals in Afghanistan in mid-2014: the existing 32,000 expeditionary force was programmed to fall to 9800 in 2015, with further reductions scheduled for 2016. In 2014 long-time MIT military analyst Harvey Sapolsky viewed as inevitable the shrinking of the US military–industrial base.15

However, in early 2014, amid spiralling tensions in Ukraine, prompted in part by a US destabilisation programme resulting in a coup d’état, Russia seized Crimea, with Crimean residents then voting to secede. In the USA Russia’s action was perceived as a casus belli requiring a de facto reversal of the in-place retrenchment programme (termed ‘sequestration’) imposing sizeable reductions in US military power projection capabilities through 2021. By January 2015 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dempsey (one of seven statutory members of the National Security Council), had proclaimed that ‘the sequestration mechanism will make it impossible for [the USA] to meet [its] global responsibilities’.16 However, nearly a year earlier, lobbyists for military contracting firms had fallen into a ‘borderline euphoric’ mood as a result of the Ukraine crisis, perceiving that the sequestration programme curbing military spending would soon be overturned.17 US Congressman Turner, Chair of the Tactical Air and Land Subcommittee of the powerful House Armed Services Committee, who was appointed to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in early 2015, declared in October 2014 that ‘Putin has solved the sequestration problem’.18

Officially declaring the end of military sequestration, President Obama announced a 7.7% increase in the ‘base defense budget’ (for Fiscal Year 2016, beginning in October 2015), with high-profit weapons systems contracts to rise by more than 14%.19 Reversing course yet again, the Obama administration remounted a stealthy ‘Secretive War’ in Afghanistan, spearheaded by bombers, drones, US Special Forces and Afghanistan commando teams, in late 2014, with a further escalations in early 2015.20 Stealth programmes – such as the CIA’s largest operation, using $1 billion in 2014/15 to fund forces in Syria – are not included in the military’s ‘base budget’, nor for the parallel ‘Overseas Contingency Operations’ budget. The CIA – one of 17 off-budget intelligence or secret operations entities – received roughly $15 billion in 2015.21

In February 2015 the Obama administration released the key National Security Strategy, 2015 document. Declaring a ‘pivotal moment’ while asserting that ‘America must lead’, the document’s opening section championed global militarism: ‘US forces will continue to… conduct global counterterrorism operations, assure allies, and deter aggression through forward presence and engagement. If deterrence fails, US forces will be ready to project power globally to defeat and deny aggression in multiple theaters.’22

The accelerating scope and pace of US interventions

US military interventions since WW II have spanned the globe, with at least 67 major intrusions recorded from 1945 to 1999, over 80% of which occurred in the global South.23 Since then, particularly with the promulgation of the ‘Bush Doctrine’ in 2002 – articulating the option of initiating unilateral war as part of the National Security Strategy of the USA – US incursions have increased and broadened under conditions of constant war-fighting. According to a Congressional Research Service report, from the beginning of 2000 to August 2014 presidents have used the War Powers Resolution, or its equivalent, to authorise military interventions on 81 occasions, including re-approval of some previous interventions.24 Of these interventions, up to August 2014 all occurred in the global South, save several in the Balkan region (part of what Raúl Prebisch described as the ‘periphery’) as the former Yugoslavia was dismembered.

It is important to understand that, increasingly, the US Congress now obscures the scope of military adventurism by frequently registering multiple interventions. For example, in December 2011 the report on the use of presidential war powers imprecisely noted that ‘The United States has deployed various “combat-equipped forces” to a number of locations in the Central, Pacific, European, Southern, and African Command areas of operation’.25 Thus, there can be no doubt that US military interventions since the beginning of 2000 are a multiple of the 81 authorisations registered, and that today such reports hide much more than they reveal.

Military interventions as systemic developments: delineating Falk’s ‘triptych’ Richard Falk posited that in the post-World War II era US interventions have occurred as a result of three ‘systemic developments’. In this section his main summary points are concisely encapsulated, followed by further elaboration regarding Falk’s triptych. First, Falk argued that after World War II rival ‘core’ powers were forced to relinquish their colonies, creating a postcolonial setting that allowed for US interventions as exercises of hegemonic power throughout the global South. Under such conditions the USA sought ‘to justify its actions by setting forth an altruistic and unselfish argument’.26 Invariably North– South interventions provoked national resistance and the USA was often forced to leave the battlefield without a victory and frequently with a clear defeat – as in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan. In these interventions neither direct economic interests nor broader geopolitical structures were acknowledged by the powers that be.

North-South intrusions

In interpreting these North–South intrusions, it is extremely difficult to document the underlying political economy, direct or structural, of US interventions through an analysis of any particular confrontation. In the USA a fog of disinformation has hung over each intervention. Since legitimacy hinges on the consent that the populace grants such interventions (a key component of hegemony, as Gramsci maintained), the ‘underlying population’ has been conditioned to passively accept the idea that these interventions arise from a range of considerations, all non-material in nature.

The National Security State (NSS) – the ‘state within the state’ – is a highly sophisticated administrative apparatus designed to coordinate the complex triangular structure sometimes known as the ‘military–industrial complex’ or the ‘Iron Triangle’ – depicted by Eisenhower as ‘the delta of power’.27 The NSS exercises limited, embedded, autonomy, usually with great discretion.28 Far from the formulations of the ‘Garrison State’ hypothesis – which posited that a ‘statist’ national security-dominated executive branch would arise to dominate the political–economic structure – the NSS frequently exists as a handmaiden of power; it is structurally embedded in an intricate, asymmetrical, political economy configuration that is (in general) quietly dominated by peak, private-sector, military contracting organisations, such as the Aerospace Industries Association. The NSS has never had the capacity, or will, to contain the endless debacle of run-away profiteering and cost-overrun Pentagon contracting processes that were institutionalised during World War II.29

However, policy makers within the NSS are ever-alert to maintain the ‘moral legitimacy’ of US interventions. Thus, a careful analysis of any particular intervention will normally not yield significant documentation regarding the material roots of the episode. Of course, there are cases of US intervention where such material roots have been well-documented – eg the overthrow of the Arbenz government in Guatemala, or the US–UK overthrow of the Mossadegh government in Iran in the 1950s.30 Nevertheless, such events have not displaced the intellectual hegemony anchored in the ether of ‘moral legitimacy’ through which the populace consents to grant the US military apparatus, broadly understood, near complete latitude to act at will. Nor has ‘moral legitimacy’ wavered as a result of research showing that 21st century interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq have created immense, ‘long-tail’, fiscal obligations to war veterans in the form of future medical expenditures, which will eventually entail large tax commitments – an estimated $4–$6 trillion, for two ‘small’ wars.31

Only in the rarest of instances have functionaries at the lower level of the NSS confirmed the views of critics, who emphasised the material basis for such interventions. During the 1970s, as the ‘Vietnam syndrome’ gained traction, two CIA officers, Philip Agee and John Stockwell, revealed the vast US intelligence network throughout Latin America and Africa.32 The ‘Church Committee’ (the US Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities) published the most extensive reports on covert state activities available to date in 1975 and 1976. Nonetheless, the onset of the neoliberal era – largely commencing with the Reagan Administration in 1981 – ushered in a period of quiescence and social conformity that did not inspire many future book-length efforts by ex-agents anxious to reveal day-to-day operations at the CIA or elsewhere within the NSS. The fact that the Obama administration has prosecuted and imprisoned more government employees who have disclosed covert actions committed by the state within the state than all previous administrations has facilitated the unanalysed pursuit of continual expeditionary adventurism.33

Neoliberalism is a complex, quickly metamorphosing doctrine with many objectives, including especially a largely successful campaign to de-politicise the vast ‘underlying population’.34 As a consequence of this effort, it has only been in the context of the run-up to intervention in Iraq in 2003 that the intellectual hegemony of US militarism has been questioned within the country since the last aftershocks of the Vietnam war era. Notably useful in this short moment of re-politicisation have been the contributions of Blum, which offered a popular summary of US interventions, and Kolko, who presented a sophisticated critique of the pretentions of US power projection.35 Nevertheless, as the ‘perpetual war’ era of the 21st century was consolidated in Afghanistan and Iraq, such disavowals were gradually subordinated through a new crystallisation of US ‘conventional wisdom’, which ceased to view ongoing military campaigns as events beyond the ‘ordinary’. This unnoticed transmogrification was achieved through the constant ‘reframing’ of the geopolitical policies of the US as merely ‘necessary, protective, defensive’ measures as the ‘Pentagon propaganda machine’ worked assiduously with the mass media to de-legitimate opposition to these interventions and promote a numbing, universal ‘patriotic’ discourse.36

Popular disengagement and intervention

Second, Falk emphasised the attention the power elite has given to the avoidance of US war casualties, using technologies that effectively shift the fatalities of war-fighting onto (largely) foreign non-combatants.

After Vietnam great care was given to the maintenance of consent through popular disengagement from the realities of intervention. Then President Carter began the reconstruction of US military intervention capabilities with the Rapid Deployment Force. Such new capabilities allowed for lightning US intervention in Panama in 1989. In 2003 ‘Shock and Awe’ – achieved through the rapid advance of overwhelming force – were thought to be the military tactics that would bring Iraq under US dominance before the American populace had an opportunity to react to events. In this instance, as Falk emphasised, Iraqi national resistance quickly formed and a prolonged battle ensued. ‘Fast intervention’, conducted with an array of high-tech weaponry, is designed to assure relatively few US military personnel killed in action. Thus, there is a constant substitution of capital for manpower in the field of battle for many reasons, one being that US corpses quickly pierce the carefully constructed fog of intellectual hegemony deployed to ensure US citizen consent in the application of military force in distant Southern nations. Interventions, then, have been facilitated through new processes and procedures carefully constructed to create a sufficient degree of autonomy to permit the US state to ‘project power’ and intervene without broad societal resistance. Nonetheless, prolonged engagements resulting from creative forms of asymmetric national resistance regularly erode and degrade US social consent, requiring its constant reconstruction.

This erosion of consent can be forestalled to a considerable degree thanks to a culturally well-entrenched allegiance to US militarism. Militarism entails both individual and societal deference to all things military – including the military definition of reality, as Mills argued: ‘military power has become an ascendant end in itself…heightening the prestige and increasing the power of the military…tends to become a basis of national policy’.37 However, US militarism has always, ultimately, been a civilian-dominated construct, although since 1945 the civil–military relationship has frequently been ‘fractious, combative and problematic’.38 Militarism is the societal belief that the use of force in international relations – as a preferred option – can achieve national objectives. Furthermore, it is the dominance of military affairs in the construction of national priorities and policies. Militarism, in the US guise, does not mean that high-ranking military cadres precipitate episodes of ‘power projection’. Rather, most frequently, this role is filled by civilians – often in the face of opposition or scepticism from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Militarists believe in the ‘logic of violence’, although there is no logic to violence except its assurance of ‘blowback’. Militarism has its deepest roots in the south states of America, where ‘valour’ and unquestioning ‘patriotism’ have long been held up as the highest of societal values. Today US military bases are spread throughout the southern states, reflecting the abiding influence of generations of jingoistic Senators and Congressional Representatives. US militarism is embraced by an influential portion of the civilian population, regardless of geography, particularly through the institutional power of the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW, with 1.4 million members), the American Legion (2.4 million veteran members) and retired officer associations. Of equal importance, with the end of national military service (in 1973), a multi-generational ‘caste’ of military families formed, with the south states constituting its strongest representation.39

1. Charles Darwin, “The Origin of Species” [↑](#footnote-ref-1)